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ABSTRACT
The Cold War has ended and the role of the National Guard has evolved from a
strategic reserve force to an integral part of today's Total Force. The National Guard's
representation in the joint environment however is still representative of its Cold War
mission and could present risk if it is not updated to reflect the new roles and missions of
the National Guard. The new roles and missions of the National Guard require it to
operate seamlessly in the joint environment, a role that was traditionally covered by its
active counterparts. This evolution in roles and missions requires the National Guard's
role in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase to accurately represent and plan for Guard
involvement in joint operations. This thesis reviews the new roles and missions of the
National Guard, as identified in the Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, and
the directorates within the Joint Staff that directly influence them. Specific areas within
each directorate that influence National Guard integration are identified and then
prioritized. The result is a recommendation of current and proposed positions within the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in priority order due to anticipated resource constraints, that will
best support seamless integration of the National Guard into joint operations. The thesis
concludes with specific recommendations on the selection and management of National
Guard personnel assigned to Joint Staff positions.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The world has changed drastically since the collapse of the Berlin Wall; yet
National Guard involvement in joint decision making remains largely stuck in the past.
The lack of National Guard representation in the joint environment creates potential risk
in joint operations where National Guard forces are involved. This thesis reviews the
current National Guard representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommends 30
positions as necessary to insure the Guard is better integrated into the joint environment.
The recommendations are prioritized to account for potential resourcing issues when
filling the positions.
During the Cold War, the National Guard did not require significant Joint Staff
representation because the Guard's primary mission was to serve as a strategic reserve
and joint decisionmaking played only a minor role in defense planning, budgeting and
operational issues. Only with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of in 1986 did the Joint Staff begin to emerge as a key
contributor to defense policymaking. As a result, both the Guard's and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff roles have changed dramatically.
The National Guard now carries far greater responsibilities for National Defense
than it did during the Cold War and must now operate seamlessly in the joint
environment. Joint Vision 2010 requires every component — including the National
Guard — to be .fully integrated into the joint environment as part of Joint Vision 201 0's
Full-Spectrum Force.
Joint institutions have made terrific progress in facilitating joint decisionmaking
and coordination for the Active Component (AC), however; the National Guard remains a
very limited partner in the process. Little growth has occurred in National Guard
representation in the Joint Staff, even as National Guard roles and missions have
expanded. Raw statistics make this under-representation evident. Today, the National
IX
Guard makes up 21 percent of the U.S. military but is less than two percent of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Yet, these raw statistics understate the degree to which the Reserve Component
lacks adequate representation. What is important is not just the percentage of the forces
in the Reserve Component (RC), but their new responsibilities for national defense. With
overseas military operations proliferating and the armed services having shrunk by a third
since the Cold War, the Pentagon has been forced to rely more heavily on the Guard and
Reserves to conduct such operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. That reliance is
likely to persist. In addition to overseas requirements, the Guard is also fulfilling new
roles and missions in the areas of Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies,
Shaping the International Environment and Major Theater Wars.
What is at risk if the National Guard continues to be excluded from key aspects of
joint decisionmaking? The National Guard cannot operate seamlessly with the other
components until it is fully integrated into the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Anything short of
full integration in the joint arena could create unnecessary risk in joint operations
involving National Guard forces. The unnecessary risk could develop from any aspect of
National Guard employment where joint planning or joint decisions are made without a
thorough understanding of the National Guard. This concern was emphasized by the
Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE 2005) which said unfamiliarity within
the AC with RC missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hampers the
ability of the Department of Defense to use the RC most effectively. The Guard needs
adequate representation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce potential risk in its new
roles and missions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the end of the Cold War, the requirements for National Guard representation
in the Joint Chiefs of Staff have grown sharply. The National Guard has been assigned
roles and missions far beyond those it played in the past. At the same time, the need for
jointness in planning, resourcing and executing these missions has grown, particularly as
the National Guard and the active component work together to strengthen Total Force
Integration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provides the key arena for such joint
decisionmaking. Yet, National Guard representation in the Joint Staff and other key JCS
organizations has changed remarkably little since the Cold War, despite the dramatic shift
in Guard responsibilities.
This thesis identifies specific shortfalls in National Guard representation in the
Joint Staff and other Joint organizations, and recommends changes that would have the
greatest potential payoff for improving decisionmaking in Guard-related missions. The
thesis begins by analyzing the crucial role that jointness now plays in the national
defense. Next, the thesis assesses the new roles and missions assigned to the National
Guard, which increase the need for Guard representation in the Joint Staff and other joint
institutions. The thesis then analyzes current National Guard representation in these joint
institutions, and provides a prioritized set of recommendations to strengthen Guard
participation in joint decisionmaking.
A. THE ISSUES AT STAKE
Considerable attention has focused recently on the question of whether to grant
the Chief, NGB a full seat on the Joint Chefs of Staff and promote the Chief to 4 star
rank. This thesis focuses on a much less visible but extremely significant issue: the need
to adjust National Guard representation in the Joint Staff to match recent shifts in Guard
roles and missions.
During the Cold War, the National Guard did not require significant Joint Staff
representation for two reasons. First, the primary mission for the Guard was to serve as a
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strategic reserve, and that mission did not appear at the time to demand extensive Guard
participation in joint decisionmaking. Second, for much of the Cold War, joint
decisionmaking played only a minor role in defense planning, budgeting and operational
issues. Only with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of in 1986 did the Joint Staff begin to emerge as a key contributor to
defense policymaking. Prior to that legislation, the Guard could safely ignore the Joint
Staff because it was little more than a rubber stamp for decisions already made by the
services.
Both factors have now changed dramatically. The National Guard carries far
greater responsibilities for National Defense than it did during the Cold War. As noted in
The 1998 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and Congress, "today,
Reserve Component forces are fully integrated into all war plans, and no major military
operation can be successful without their participation." 1 This participation requires
every component — including the National Guard — to be fully integrated into the joint
environment as part of Joint Vision 2010 's Full-Spectrum Force. In Joint Vision 2010,
General Shalikashvily states, "to achieve this integration while conducting military
operations we must be fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and
technically."
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Joint institutions have made terrific progress in facilitating joint decisionmaking
and coordination for the Active Component (AC). In important respects, however, the
National Guard remains a very limited partner in that process. In conducting the research
for this thesis, I was struck by how little growth has occurred in National Guard
representation in the Joint Staff, even as National Guard roles and missions have
expanded. Raw statistics make this under-representation evident. Today, 38 percent of
1 Cohen, William S. The Annual Report to the President and Congress (1998): Available [Online]:
<www.dtic.mil/execsec/ adr98/chap9.html>. [25 January 00].
2 Shalikashvily, John M. Joint Vision 2010. Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.
U.S. military forces come from the Reserve Component, yet its representation on the JCS
is only six percent. The National Guard alone makes up 21 percent of the U.S. military
but is less than two percent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Yet, these raw statistics understate the degree to which the Reserve Component
lacks adequate representation. What is important is not just the percentage of the forces
in the Reserve Component (RC), but their new responsibilities for national defense. With
overseas military operations proliferating and the armed services having shrunk by a third
since the Cold War, the Pentagon has been forced to rely more heavily on the Guard and
Reserves to conduct such operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. That reliance is
likely to persist. A recent Pentagon study predicted the demand for Guard and Reserve
deployments to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years. 3 In addition to overseas
requirements, the Guard is also fulfilling new roles in the area of Homeland Defense.
The creation of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Teams, the
Consequence Management (CM) mission, and potential fielding of a National Missile
Defense (NMD) system are just a few of the growing number of missions with which the
Guard is being tasked.
The National Guard is also deeply involved in the area of Strategic Shaping.
Programs such as the State Partnership for Peace (SPP) Program, International Disaster
Relief, and ongoing Peacekeeping Operations all contribute directly to strategic shaping.
All of these new mission areas require JCS coordination to ensure they are fully
integrated into and support the National Military Strategy. In short, the world has
changed drastically since the collapse of the Berlin Wall; yet National Guard involvement
in joint decision making remains largely stuck in the past.
Who cares? What is at risk if the National Guard continues to be excluded from
key aspects ofjoint decisionmaking? The National Guard cannot operate seamlessly with
-> Myers, Steven L. "Reservist New Role Transforms the Military." The New York Times (24 January
2000): Available [Online]: <www.nytimes.com>. [25 January 2000].
the other components until it is fully integrated into the JCS. Anything short of full
integration in the joint arena could create unnecessary risk in joint operations involving
National Guard forces. The unnecessary risk could develop from any aspect of National
Guard employment where joint planning or joint decisions are made without a thorough
understanding of the National Guard. This concern was emphasized by the Reserve
Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE 2005) which said that "unfamiliarity within
the AC with RC missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hampers the
ability of the Department (Department of Defense) to use the RC most effectively."4 The
Guard needs adequate representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce potential risk
in the new roles and missions of Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies
(SSCs), Shaping the International Environment and Major Theater Wars (MTWs), by
ensuring its forces are fully integrated into joint operations.
In the roles and missions associated with Homeland Defense, potential risk can
arise from a number of factors. First, in the event of a disaster or consequence within a
state, the National Guard needs to be integrated into all JCS planning as the most likely
first responder. Second, the National Guard has fielded Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Teams throughout the U.S., which are trained in WMD and Consequence
Management (CM). These teams need to be incorporated into JCS planning to utilize and
leverage their specialized training. Finally, all Homeland Defense missions will require
coordination between the services and other government and non-government agencies.
The current lack of Guard joint integration in these areas was evident in the planning
portion of the Dynamic Commitment exercise, which is part of the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). In the vignettes for this QDR resourcing exercise the role of the
Guard was minimal, yet in reality it would play a major role in many of the vignettes.
4 Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (2 August 1999): Available
[Online]: <ww.defenselink.mil/'pubs/'rces2005 072299 .html>. [28 January 2000].
In the area of Smaller Scale Contingencies, potential risk could arise from not
fully integrating the Guard into SSC planning. One recommendation from RCE 2005
envisions the Guard providing a brigade size Task Force in a Bosnia type scenario. In
such a scenario, the Guard must be fully integrated into the development of the brigade
task force to meet the scenario requirements. The Guard must be trained and ready to
deploy as a mission ready brigade task force to meet the regional Commander in Chiefs
(CESfCs) requirements. The Guard currently lacks any representation in the Joint
Warfighting Analysis Division of the J-8, which is responsible to integrate the RC into
MTWs and SSCs.
In the arena of Shaping the International Environment, potential risk could arise
from the JCS not fully incorporating the actions of the National Guard under its State
Partnership for Peace (SPP) Program. The Guard is actively participating in its SPP
Program and developing a working relationship with the states involved in the program.
The associations and working relationships could be leveraged by the JCS by integrating
the states involved with any operations involving the foreign state they are partnered with.
A lack of integrating the Guard would confuse foreign states with established ties to a
state National Guard unit. The Guard currently lacks any representation in the J-5, the
Directorate responsible for Strategic Plans and Policy.
The roles and missions associated with Major Theater War's present potential risk
because the JCS and CINCs have yet to mission all the National Guard Divisions. The
current AC forces face increased requirements from SSCs, peacekeeping operations, and
other requirements, all of which have stretched the AC forces thin. In the event of a
second MTW, the smaller AC forces will need the Guard to be successful. The Guard
must be integrated into the plans for potential scenarios now to reduce the risk involved
in crisis planning when time is short. The J-3 and J-7 Directorates are largely responsible
for these areas and the recommended positions in each Directorate will greatly reduce the
current risk.
Potential risk can also be found in resourcing, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff play a
crucial role in allocating resources for the U.S. military. In order to successfully execute
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their new roles and missions the Guard must have the necessary funding. In the past,
because the National Guard had so little representation in DOD decisionmaking on
budget issues, the Guard often had to rely on Congressional intervention in order to
secure essential funding. The intervention of Congress in defense budgeting creates the
impression of interservice squabbling and an inability to resolve issues without
congressional oversight. It would be far preferable to strengthen the representation of the
National Guard in joint decisionmaking within DOD, so that resourcing issues can be
resolved at that level. Internal resolution of resourcing will also be a significant step for
Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) integration.
B. THESIS METHODOLOGY
This thesis uses Department of Defense (DOD) documents to identify the future
roles and missions of the National Guard. Specific documents include the Reserve
Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE 2005), the National Security Strategy (NSS),
the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), and
various joint documents to include manning documents and individual duty descriptions
of Joint Staff members. Dozens of interviews were also conducted with members of the
National Guard Bureau, the Army and Air National Guard, members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Joint Staff Directorates, and key staff members involved with the
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. This thesis could never have been
written without the invaluable information I gained from these interviews. However, the
arguments and conclusions in this thesis are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the officers and civilians interviewed.
Chapter JJ reviews the rise of jointness and analyzes its growing significance for
defense policymaking. The chapter also reviews the composition of the JCS, focusing
specifically on the Joint Staff. Chapter III uses the Reserve Component Employment 2005
Study and the National Security Strategy to examine the emerging roles and missions of
the National Guard, and analyzes the requirements of these missions for joint
decisionmaking. These roles and missions include Homeland Defense and Information
Operations, Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs), Shaping the International Environment,
and Major Theater Wars (MTWs).
Chapter IV reviews the current National Guard representation on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and examines the issues surrounding that representation on the OCJCS, JCS
Boards, Councils and Committees, and the Joint Staff. Each issue area is discussed to
highlight its importance and is tied to specific recommendations to improve the
inadequacies identified in the existing arrangement. Chapter V addresses the practical
challenges of implementing these recommendations.
C. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Although there are a lot of recommendations on where the National Guard should
place its officers, there is not only a limit on the resources available to this, but also a
limit on officers qualified to fill the jobs. Because of these limitations, I have prioritized
my recommendations so they can be used in an incremental process for fielding National
Guard officers on the Joint Staff. The entire list of recommendations is found in Chapter
V, Figure 5-1. The following are the top ten recommendations of this thesis.
The first recommendation and highest priority is the existing Assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard Matters (ACJCS/NG) position.
This position is authorized and is currently filled. This position is in the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS) and is the highest ranking and most
influential position the Guard has on the JCS. The ability of the ACJCS/NG to access the
JCS leadership is critical to gaining support for the new roles and missions of the
National Guard. The concern with this position is it lacks any real authority. The
recommendation is to fill this position first, but increase the responsibilities and role of
the position on the JCS Boards, Councils and Committees.
The second recommendation is the Executive Officer to the ACJCS/NG. This
position is authorized and is currently filled. This position is in the OCJCS and is
responsible to coordinate the staff actions and schedules for the ACJCS/NG. The reason
this position is ranked second is it is critical to the effectiveness of the ACJCS/NG and if
there were only two Guard personnel on the JCS, this position would be critical to the
effectiveness of the ACJCS/NG. The recommendation is to fill this position second.
The third recommendation is in the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training
Division in the J-7. This position is authorized and is currently filled. This position is
responsible for integrating the RC into the J-7, which directly affects the new roles and
missions of the National Guard. The current representation in this area is very important
because it is the "deep fight" for the Guard. The J-7 is responsible for integrating the
Guard into joint exercises and training, conventional war plans, joint assessment and
analysis and joint doctrine which is key to joint interoperability. The recommendation is
to fill this position third with the most senior Guard member on the JCS.
The fourth recommendation is in the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) branch of
the J-3. This is a new, recommended position. This position is responsible for
integrating the National Guard into the JFCOM branch of the J-3. There is currently no
representation for the National Guard in the JFCOM branch. The problem is JFCOM is
assuming the role of Domestic Disaster Response and Consequence Management, an area
the Guard has traditionally played a major role in as the state's first responder in such
events. The recommendation is to fill this position fourth by re-assigning the current
National Guard position in the Joint History Office to this position and filling it with an
0-6(ARNGorANG).
The fifth and sixth recommendations are in the Conventional War Plans Division
of the J-7. These positions are authorized and are currently filled. These positions are
responsible for the Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs), planning for a second Major
Theater War (MTW), and insuring the new roles and missions of the Guard are
incorporated into Annexes A (where the CINC addresses the RC) and T (the inter-agency
political and military planning annex) of the Joint Operational Planning and Execution
System (JOPES). These positions are critical to reducing the risk of not incorporating the
Guard and its Divisions into the operational planning for potential scenarios. The
recommendation is to fill these positions fifth and sixth.
The seventh recommendation is in the Joint Vision and Doctrine Division of the
J-7. This is a new, recommended position. This position will be responsible for National
Guard integration into Doctrine Network Education and Training (DOCNET), the Joint
Doctrine Operational Lab (JDOL), and Advanced Distributive Learning (ADL). These
programs are part of the distributive training programs that will be utilized by all services
for joint education. Guard representation here is critical to insure it has access to each of
the programs in the future. The recommendation is to fill this position seventh by
assigning an 0-5 (ARNG or ANG) to the position.
The eighth recommendation is in the Joint Requirements Division of the J-8. This
is an authorized and currently filled position. This position is responsible to integrate and
represent the National Guard in force structure and resource analysis. This position is
critical because it recommends near-, mid- and long-term force structure to support
national security objectives, policy and strategy. The recommendation is to fill this
position eighth, but increase the position's responsibilities and access to the J-8
leadership.
The ninth recommendation is in the Information Operations Division of the J-3.
This is an authorized but currently vacant position. This position is responsible for
providing Information Operations (IO), and Special Technical Operations (STO) support
to the JCS, SecDef and CINCs. This position is important because it provides the Guard
with an active liaison in the development ofjoint policy, strategy and doctrine concerning
Information Operations and Information Warfare (IO/IW). The recommendation is to fill
this position ninth and assign an 0-4 (ARNG or ANG) to this authorized position.
The tenth recommendation is in the Strategy Division of the J-5. This is a new,
recommended position. This position is responsible for integrating the Guard into the
NSS, NMS, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint Planning Document (JPD) and
TEPs. This position is critical to the National Guard because the National Guard
currently has no representation in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. The
recommendation is to fill this position tenth and by assigning an 0-5 (ARNG) to the J-5
Strategy Division.
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This thesis recommends and prioritizes a total of 30 positions on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The other positions (numbers 1 1 through 30) can be found in Chapter V, Figure
5-1. In addition to recommending and prioritizing the positions on the JCS, this thesis
would be remiss by not highlighting the importance of finding the right individuals to fill
the recommended positions.
The Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau should control the National
Guard positions on the Joint Staff, as well as the selection of officers to fill them. This is
important for three reasons. First, representatives must be knowledgeable of how the
National Guard works, the capabilities it has, and the roles and missions it performs.
Second, representatives selected to fill the positions must be exceptional because they
will be working with the Active Component's future leaders and they will form their
opinion of the National Guard based upon this initial experience. Third, the National
Guard will gain a cadre of officers with joint staff experience that will help it seamlessly
integrate the Guard into the joint environment and the Total Force.
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II. THE RISE OF JOINT DECISION MAKING INSTITUTIONS
Joint decisionmaking has been slow to take root in the United States, but now
plays a decisive role in shaping the National Defense. The first attempt by the U.S. to
establish a formal organization for joint operations occurred in 1903 with the
establishment of the Joint Board. The Joint Board was composed of the heads of the
Army and Navy and the chief planner of each service. The Joint Board was intended to
plan for joint operations, but its charter gave it no actual authority. As a result, the Joint
Board had little or no impact on the conduct of the First World War. In 1919 the Service
secretaries tried to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board, but it was given no more
legal authority than it had in 1903. With the exception of its 1935 publication of Joint
Action of the Army and Navy, which gave some guidance for the joint operations in
World War II, the Board was not influential in the war. 5
In 1942, in response to the need for coordinated staff work, a concept described by
Admiral Leahy as a "unified high command" was adopted. The group came to be known
as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under President Roosevelt's leadership, the JCS grew
in influence and became the primary agent in coordinating and giving strategic direction
to the Army and Navy.6
After the war, President Truman and officials in the War Department argued that
shifts in the security environment required an end to service autonomy. Truman noted
that one of the clearest lessons of World War II was the need for a unified direction of
U.S. land, sea and air forces. The rapid changes in warfare and technology were making
the "Armed Services much more dependent upon each other than ever before," hence the
5
"History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<mvw.dtic.mil/iccs/core/historv js.html>. [6 October 1999].
6
"History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<\v\\'VN-.dtic.mil/iccs/core/'historv js.html>. [6 October 1999].
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need for unified command "is sure to be greater if there is any future aggression against
world peace." ' The National Security Act of 1947 formally established the JCS and
began a series of legislative and executive changes that produced today's defense
organization.
The most important change was initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
o
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The intent of Goldwater-Nichols was to reorganize
the Department of Defense (DOD), strengthen civilian authority in the DOD and improve
the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council (NSC) and the
Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the Act placed clearer responsibility and authority on
the CINCs and increased attention to formulating strategy and contingency planning. The
Act also sought to reduce service parochialism by clearly placing the Joint Chiefs of Staff
above the individual services. 9
A. JCS STRUCTURE
The Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and the
Chiefs of the four services. Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Joint Staff. The Joint
Staff assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accomplishing his
responsibilities for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces; their operation
under unified command; and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and
air forces. The Joint Staff is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from
the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. In practice, the Marines make up
about 20 percent of the number allocated to the Navy. 10 The Joint Staff is authorized 806
' "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." Congressional Record (7 May 1986), S 5471.
8
"History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<www.dtic.nTil/iccs/core/historv js.html>. [6 October 1999].
"
"Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Should the General Staff
Debate be Over." (April 1997): Available [Online]: wavw.au.af.mil/aii''database /proiects/avl 997/97-
132.pdf. [5 April 2000].
10
"The Joint Staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Home Page (10 December 1999): Available [Online]:
<wwvs-.dtic.mil/ics/core/ics defn.html>. [6 October 1999].
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officers, 281 enlisted personnel and 208 civilians. 11 The organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff is depicted in Figure 2-1. In each directorate there are two numbers in
parenthesis, the first number is the number of assigned AC personnel in the directorate,
the second number is the number of assigned National Guard personnel in the directorate.
The Joint Staff has no executive authority over combatant forces, and, by law, its
direction rests exclusively with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the
Chairman directs, the Joint Staff may also assist the other JCS members in carrying out
their responsibilities. 12 The Joint Chiefs of Staff also play a key role in the boards,
councils and committees that directly influence the direction of effort and allocation of
resources, such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
B. SUMMARY
The Joint Chiefs of Staff is the premier joint decision making organization in the
United States. The JCS was created to ensure coordination between the military services
and is responsible for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces; their
operation under unified command; and their integration into an efficient team of land,
naval and air forces. The responsibilities of the JCS, and the new role and missions of the
Guard, make it critically important the National Guard is an integral part of the JCS
decision making process.
1
* "The Joint Staff Military and Civilian Strength Report." Staff Management Branch (J-l), Joint Chiefs
of Staff. 31 December 1999.
12 Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (2 August 1999): Available
[Online]: <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005 072299.html>. [28 January 2000].
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Figure 2-1 . Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Active Component/National Guard)
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III. THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RCE 2005
With the end of the Cold War, the role of the Reserve Components began a quiet
evolution. The National Guard's Cold War mission of containing and/or defeating the
Soviet Union and its allies evolved as it began to comprise a greater percentage of the
Total Force. In the past, joint operations were important, but not critical to the National
Guard's missions. Today however, joint operations are an integral part of all operations
and are critical to achieving the Full Spectrum Dominance discussed in Joint Vision 2010.
The National Guard is no longer a strategic reserve force, but an essential partner in
military operations from Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs) to Major Theater Wars
(MTWs). 13 Although this evolution has changed the roles and missions of the National
Guard, its representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff still reflects its Cold War mission.
The FY2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) required a study of
alternative concepts for employing Reserve Component (RC) forces. The result was the
Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE-2005) conducted by an integrated
team of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Active Component (AC)
and Reserve Component (RC) members. The study was conducted to define potential RC
roles and missions. The potential roles and missions identified were consolidated into the
following three categories: Homeland Defense alternatives plus Information Operations
(10), Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) alternatives, and Major Theater War (MTW)
alternatives plus Strategic Reserve.
14
Another future role not identified in RCE2005, but
identified in the President's National Security Strategy, is Shaping the International
Environment.
" Cohen, William S. The Annual Report to the President and Congress (1998): Available [Online]:
<w\vu'.dtic.miL'execsec/adr98/chap9.html>. [25 January 00].
" Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.
Washington, D.C: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc.,1999: B-l.
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A. POST COLD-WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS
1. Homeland Defense
This alternative contains five elements. The first is using the National Guard for
the emerging National Missile Defense (NMD) mission. The Guard is marked for this
mission but the time frame for implementation is unknown pending the development of
an effective missile system and the decision to employ it. The second is to activate a RC
Continental United States (CONUS) Joint Task Force (JTF) for Homeland Defense
missions (with 30% AC augmentation). The third is to establish a 400-man joint
integrated RC virtual unit for Information Operations/Information Assurance (IO/IA) and
related mission support. In this case the RC could provide stability and expertise not
normally associated with the AC. The fourth is to "Dual Mission" selected RC units for
WMD Consequence Management (CM) and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CEP)
missions. The fifth is to increase by twenty-five percent RC units/individuals rotating
through Joint Task Forces (JTFs) for drug, border defense, and immigration missions. 15
The Homeland Defense missions identified in RCE2005 and the ones the Guard is
currently involved in require joint coordination and representation. The missions involve
coordination within the military services, and also inter-agency coordination. As an
example, WMD teams must coordinate with the other services as well as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and
state, local and municipal law enforcement and emergency management agencies.
2. Smaller Scale Contingencies
This alternative contains five elements of which the first two hold the most
promise for implementation. The first is to tailor timeline restrictions established by the
theater CINCs. This refers to reducing the minimum assignment period for RC units
before they can be used in operations. The second is the RC provides every other rotation
15 Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.
Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-l.
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of follow-on interpositional peacekeeping mission requirements. The third is the RC
assumes one full, continuous, rotational follow-on Peacekeeping Accord implementation.
The third element envisions a brigade sized task force in a Bosnia-type scenario. The
fourth is to meet initial (first 60 days) SSC requirements with AC assets then follow with
RC participation. The fifth is expanded RC use in meeting High Demand/Low Density
(HD/LD) requirements. The issue in the fifth element is the division of labor between
AC and RC forces is not well balanced. 16
The requirement for joint planning and joint representation is implicit in SSCs.
The National Guard is currently involved in Smaller Scale Contingencies in Kosovo and
Bosnia, and for the first time an ARNG Division (the 49th Division, Texas ARNG) is in
command of AC units in Bosnia. The importance of the decision to place AC forces
under command of a RC Division is unprecedented in recent history and further
highlights the need for National Guard units to be fully represented and integrated in the
joint planning arena.
3. Shaping the International Environment
The Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the
International Security Environment. DOD efforts help promote regional stability, prevent
or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion on a day to day basis.
To accomplish this mission, the Department employs a wide variety of means, including
forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces
deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military to military interactions;
and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and international arms
cooperation.
17
!" Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.
Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-5.
1' Cohen, William S. Annual Report to the President and Congress (1998): Available [Online]:
<\vww.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chap9.hmil>. [25 January 2000]: p5.
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In support of the DOD role in Shaping the International Environment, the
National Guard is involved in the State Partnership for Peace (SPP) Program,
International Disaster Relief, and Peacekeeping Operations. The National Guard also
trains officers specifically for the shaping mission through the joint Center for Civil-
Military Relations and Naval Postgraduate School Masters Degree program in
International Security and Civil-Military Relations. All of these programs aid in strategic
shaping by creating and fostering relationships with the military forces of the
participating countries.
Joint planning and representation is critical in the strategic shaping environment.
The actions of the National Guard must be seamlessly integrated into the entire strategic
shaping process to insure its efforts support and complement the intent of the National
Security Strategy.
4. Major Theater Wars
This category contains four potential RC roles and missions. The first is to
increase RC participation in logistics/transportation management by twenty-five percent.
This would help the AC by eliminating current shortfalls in AC Combat Support (CS)
and Combat Service Support (CSS) and may reduce the TEMPO stress and enhance
AC/RC integration. Although converting some ARNG forces will alleviate some
CS/CSS stress; it would also reduce the ratio of combat arms units to CS/CSS in the
National Guard. The concern to the RC is this shift could change ARNG roles and





The second potential area is enhancing the role of ARNG enhanced Separate
Brigades (eSBs) in MTWs. This enhancement could occur in two separate ways. First,
developing a strategy to make ARNG units available earlier in the event of an MTW, and
1° Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.
Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-2.
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second, establish Round-Up relationships between eSBs and AC Divisions. Under the
first, better AC/RC postmobilization training should improve availability times. Under
the second, if establishment of Round-Up relationships between some eSBs and AC
Divisions demonstrates training and employment compatibility, it may lead to a Round-
Out configuration. This would guarantee ARNG units an enhanced MTW role. 19
The third area is examining roles for ARNG combat divisions in MTWs (to
include post-conflict stage). Three assessment methods can be used to examine this area.
The first is annual and postmobilization training events can be examined and compared to
deployment requirements. The second is to place four ARNG Divisions into the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportionment tables as available forces. The third is
to establish a capabilities-based Strategic Reserve for use in meeting more demanding or
20
unanticipated events.
The fourth area is to convert an additional ten percent of Echelon Above Division
(EAD) CS/CSS requirements to RC for the first MTW, to include up to a fifty percent RC
role in Reception, Staging, Onward-movement, and Integration (RSOI). This would help
fix current CS/CSS shortfalls, but as noted earlier, may reduce ARNG force structure as a
result. This area also assumed that single units would provide the unit personnel, which
would save $1 million per year. 21
National Guard involvement in joint decision making is critical for seamless
integration into MTW planning. National Guard forces must be fully integrated in to
joint planning and training to insure Guard Divisions and enhanced Separate Brigades
(eSBs) are missioned in support of the National Military Strategy.
*" Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.
Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-3.
20 Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.
Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-4.
21 Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.
Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-4/5.
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B. SUMMARY
The emerging roles and missions of the National Guard make it an integral part of
the Full Spectrum Force described in Joint Vision 2010. The four main categories of
Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies, Shaping and MTW all require the
National Guard to be fully integrated into the joint environment. In the past the National
Guard could rely on its Active Duty counterparts to coordinate and plan its limited joint
operations. Now however, the Guard must be proactive in every aspect of joint
operations to insure it fulfills its role as an integral part of the Total Force.
20
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff are authorized 1014 military personnel.
Within the 1014 military authorizations, the Reserve Component (RC) has 62 full-time
positions.
22 The RC authorizations are further divided between the Army Reserve, Air
Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, Army
National Guard and Air Force National Guard. Of the 62 RC authorizations, 20 are
authorized for the National Guard and 16 are currently filled.
In sharp contrast to their role on the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the National Guard's
role in the Total Force. The Total Force (Active/Guard/Reserve) is 2,246,362; of that
number, 38 percent, or 864,144 are in the RC.23 Within the RC, the National Guard is
476,000, or 55 percent.24 The defining statistic is the National Guard is 21 percent of the
Total Force, but is less than two percent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although this
statistic reflects small National Guard representation on the JCS, it is specific positions,
not numbers that will most benefit National Guard joint integration.
In principle, joint integration of the National Guard will require appropriate and
effective representation in the OCJCS; JCS Boards, Councils and Committees; and the
Joint Staff. In each of these three sub-elements of the-JCS there are specific "issue areas"
that have a direct influence on joint integration of the National Guard. The goal of this
analysis is to identify the issue areas where the lack of Guard representation could be
detrimental to the Total Force. The issue areas highlight where a National Guard
22
"The Joint Staff Military and Civilian Strength Report." Staff Management Branch (J-l), Joint Chiefs
of Staff. 31 December 1999.
23 FY2001 President's Budget Future Year Defense Program, ODUSD (PIO(RQ), May 12, 2000.
24
"The National Guard in a Nutshell." The National Guard Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<\vww.nub.dtic.mil/aboumH/oodv.htm> [1 1 January 2000].
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presence would help alleviate potential risk created by JCS unfamiliarity with the
National Guard and other problems.
A. IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUE AREAS
1
.
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS)
The OCJCS is lead by the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS)
who is a four star general or flag officer, and is authorized 39 officers, 27 enlisted
personnel and 24 civilians. Currently there are five National Guard personnel assigned to
the OCJCS, the Assistant to the Chairman for National Guard Matters (ACJCS/NG, an
Army National Guard (ARNG) two star general), an Executive Officer (an Air National
Guard (ANG) 04), a Force Advisor (an ARNG 06), a JRB/JWCA Action Officer (an
ARNG 05), and a Strategic Planner (an ARNG 05). The issue areas for the National
Guard in the OCJCS are the ACJCS/NG, the Legislative Assistant Office, and the Public
Affairs Office.
a. Assistant to the CJCSfor National Guard Matters (ACJCS/NG)
The position of ACJCS/NG was the result of a compromise in 1997 when
Senate Legislation was introduced to promote the Chief, NGB, to a full seat on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The legislation behind the initial move came from Senator Stevens (R-
Alaska) in response to the Army Staffs treatment of the Guard during the Pentagon's
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and a 1998 budget that shorted the Guard by $743
million. The Senate added the JCS provision to the defense authorization bill with 49 co-
sponsors. The bill however did not have equal House support and an interim proposal
was introduced to promote the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), to four stars and
place him on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The final compromise
was the appointment of two, two-star general officer positions on the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff. One position is the ACJCS/NG, and the other is the assistant to the Chairman for
Reserve Matters (ACJCS/RM, filled by a Reserve two-star general).25
The position description of the ACJCS/NG as stated in the FYOO Annual
Report to Congress is: "Serve as Personal Staff Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Advises the Chairman on all matters within his purview affecting the
Army and Air National Guard. Acts as the Chairman's personal liaison with the Chief,
National Guard Bureau (CNGB) and state governors, participates in Defense forums such
as the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) and the Joint Review Board (JRB). Advises
the Chairman on the utilization of the Guard in emerging missions and CINC war plans.
As directed, represents the Chairman to members of Congress and staffers."
The duty description for the ACJCS/NG lacks any real authority in the
joint environment and could be covered by the Vice-Chief, National Guard Bureau
(VCNGB) or CNGB. The ACJCS/RM could is not a member of the JROC or Defense
Resource Board (DRB), nor does the position afford the Guard much greater leverage on
the Joint Staff that it had before. The ACJCS/NG is still subordinate to nine general
officers on the joint staff and is a peer with an additional six. The issue of rank comes
down to one of "equal in component". The ACJCS/NG could be argued to be "equal in
component" to an AC three or four star general, but retains only the authority and
influence of a two star general. The issue of "equal in component" could be resolved
without increasing the rank of the ACJCS/NG by allowing the position direct
representation on the JCS Boards, Councils and Committees.
The specific issue area is the National Guard is forced to operate from a
subordinate position on the JCS and its boards, councils and committees. The JCS has a
total of 18 officers in the rank of two-star or higher. If the current representation does not
25
"Cohen Establishes New General Officer Positions." Newsstand (9 January 1998): Available [Online]:
<ww-w.ngaus.org/starestablish.html>. [21 April 1999].
26 Duty Description for Assistant to the CJCS for National Guard Matters. JS Form 148. DEC 1999.
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improve, the National Guard will continue to fight for resources and joint integration
from a subordinate position.
ACJCS/NG Recommendation. Recommend the ACJCS/NG remain a
two-star billet, but be given increased representation and authority on the JCS Boards,
Councils and Committees such as the JROC, Joint Material Priorities and Allocation
Board and the Military Communication-Electronic Board (MCEB).
b. Legislative Assistant Office
The legislative process in its simplest terms is "selling" the importance of
military resourcing to those who write the checks. The new roles and missions of the
National Guard require a larger role in joint operations and therefore increased resources
from Congress. If the National Guard is to be successful in its new roles and missions, it
must have legislative support in the arena where joint decision making and planning will
occur. The National Guard currently has its own legislative liaison office, but having
representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not only help the JCS, it would show
Congress the depth and willingness ofAC/RC integration.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff stand to gain significantly from National Guard
involvement in the JCS legislative office. The Guard is involved in every state and
territory in the U.S., and therefore every member of Congress has a vested interest in the
National Guard. Additionally, as a member of their Governor's staff, state Adjutant
Generals have the ability to present important legislative issues to their Governors. The
Guard's political support can be a great asset to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all services
if used correctly.
Legislative Assistance Office Recommendation. Recommend creating a
new National Guard position and assigning an 0-5 (ARNG or ANG) in the Legislative
Assistant Office to represent the National Guard's involvement in the joint environment
and in the JCS.
c. Public Affairs Office
The members of the Army and Air National Guard involved in joint
operations require and deserve public affairs representation that reflects their unique
24
characteristics. National Guard units are an integral part of their communities and public
affairs is important in providing a link back to their families and community. As the
National Guard plays a larger role in joint operations and its units deploy away from their
communities, they will need public affairs representation to keep the close tie with their
communities. This representation will have a great effect on morale for not only the
soldiers, but also their families, their community, their employers and future recruiting
efforts in the community. Public Affairs representation for the Guard is no more
important than that afforded the active component, but like the active component, it is
best represented by one of its own.
Public Affairs Office Recommendation. Recommend creating a new
National Guard position and assigning an E-8 (ARNG or ANG non-commissioned
officer) to represent and cover RC participation in JCS exercises and deployments.
2. JCS Boards, Councils and Committees
The JCS Boards, Councils, and Committees include the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board and the
Military Communication-Electronics Board (MCEB). The issue area for the National
Guard in the JCS Boards, Councils and Committees is the JROC.
a. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
The JROC is required by Section 181(b) of Title 10 to assist the CJCS by
identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements (including existing
systems and equipment) to meet the National Military Strategy (NMS); considering
alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified to meet military
requirements by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the program
and of identified alternatives; assigning joint priority among existing and future programs
meeting valid requirements, and ensuring that the assignment of such priorities conforms
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to and reflects resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) through the
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).27
The responsibilities of the JROC are associated not only with the Joint
Strategic Planning System (JSPS), but also support the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS); the Requirements Generation System (RGS); and the
Acquisition Management System (AMS). The JROC, using the Joint Warfighting
Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, supports the JSPS by assisting the CJCS in
providing programming assessment and advice to the SecDef. This advice is documented
in the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Chairman's Program
Assessment (CPA). These documents weigh heavily in the programming and budgeting
decisions made by the SecDef in the PPBS. Since all of this JROC energy is focused on
requirements and capabilities, it is logical that the JROC also has oversight responsibility
of the RGS.28
The JROC is the validation and approval authority for Mission Need
Statements (MNSs) as they work their way through the RGS. The JROC only reviews
MNSs that may become expensive or are otherwise significant programs. Upon approval,
the JROC forwards the MNSs to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) for consideration.
The JROC may also address non-major programs to resolve contentious and high-interest
issues such as: designation of the lead Service or agency, requirements disconnects, or to
review programs at the request of the SecDef or the Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition and Technology.29
27 Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval War College: Available [Online]:
<www.nwc.navy.miynsdm/nsdrnravl.htm>. [25 January 2000].
2° Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval War College: Available [Online]:
<www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/nsdmrav l.htm>. [25 January 2000]: 4-10.
29 Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval War College: Available [Online]:
<www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdrn/nsdmravl.htm>. [25 January 2000]: 4-10.
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The JROC is not officially a part of any of the strategic foundation
decision-making systems; however, it is closely tied to and supports all of them. The
JROC is considered the glue that bonds the systems together. 30 The JROC, which is a
council of the JCS, is chaired by the VCJCS and its members include a four star
representative from each of the services.
The JROC is one of the most influential councils on the JCS and is
fundamental in the resourcing process. The JROC provides programming assessment and
advice to the SecDef, is the validation and approval authority for Mission Need
Statements (MNSs), and resolves contentious and high interest issues. The National
Guard currently lacks direct representation to present or defend its resource concerns on
the JROC. In the past, the Guard has suffered as a result. Integration of the Guard into
the joint environment requires integration into the JROC as well.
JROC Recommendation. Recommend creating a National Guard
position on the JROC for the CNGB to directly represent Guard resourcing issues.
3. The Joint Staff
The Joint Staff includes the primary directorates (J-l through J-8) and the
Directorate of Management (DOM). The following is a discussion of each of the staff
directorates and the issue areas for the National Guard in each directorate.
a, J-l
The J-l is the Directorate for Manpower and Personnel. The
responsibilities of the J-l are to manage manpower, formulate personnel policies, and
supervise administration of personnel, including civilians and prisoners of war. 31 The
goals of the J-l include enhancing total force readiness through the Joint Warfighting
Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) and Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process,
30
"Joint Exercise and Training Division." The Joint staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<\vAv%\.dtic.rnil/ics/ietd.htrn>. [24 January 2000].
31
"Functions of Joint Staff Divisions." The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1997: Available [Online]:
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optimizing the Joint Staff organization to support the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and
the JCS, and provide highly qualified manpower and personnel support to the staff and
other agencies.
The J-l is lead by a one star general or flag officer and is authorized 22
officers, 12 enlisted personnel and 17 civilians. Although there are responsibilities within
the J-l that are of significance to the National Guard, the functions of the J-l are
primarily component neutral. Additionally, J-l personnel have been trained in National
Guard specific J-l responsibilities. The current United States Army Reserve (USAR) RC
Advisor (05) in the J-l adequately represents National Guard concerns. There are no
issue areas for the National Guard in the J-l.
J-l Recommendation. No recommended changes to the J-l at this time.
b. J-2
The J-2 is the Intelligence Directorate. The J-2 provides all-source
intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff,
and unified commands. The J-2 is unique on the Joint Staff because it is also part of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a combat support agency. The J-2 apprises the
Chairman of foreign situations and intelligence issues relevant to current operational
interests and potential national security policies, objectives and strategy. This includes
providing indications, warning and crisis intelligence support, supporting unified
command intelligence requirements, developing joint intelligence doctrine, developing
joint architecture, coordinating support requirements, and providing targeting support.
Currently there are no National Guard personnel assigned to the J-2. The issue area for
the National Guard in the J-2 is the J2R. The J2R is the Reserve Component manager
that oversees the employment of reserve forces in support of the J-2.
<www.afsc.edu/pub 1 /afsc02 1 z.htm>. [26 January 2000].
32
"Mission of the Directorate for Intelligence." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<www.dtic.mil/ics/core/j2.html>. [24 January 2000].
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(1) J2R Division. The J2R manages all military reserve issues for
the J-2 and advises the J-2 on all RC matters. Specific duties include assisting J-2
Functional Managers in addressing issues which impact the Reserve intelligence
component and its utilization, ensuring J-2 reserve assets are fully integrated into the J-2
mission, determining J-2 roles and missions that can be fulfilled by reserve assets, and the
employment of RC forces in support of the J-2. The J2R is responsible for providing the
J2 with peacetime intelligence production and watch standing support as well as
capability to meet exercise, contingency operations, surge requirements, and special
intelligence taskings. National Guard representation in this division would help integrate
National Guard intelligence assets into joint operations and increase Joint Staff awareness
of Guard capabilities. The Guard would also benefit by providing its members with J-2
experience through Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) and Active Duty Training (ADT)
tour opportunities in support of J-2 operations.
J2R Recommendation. Recommend creating a new National
Guard position in the J-2R and assigning an E-8 (ARNG or ANG non-commissioned
officer) to work within the J2R to integrate National Guard personnel into J2 operations.
c. J-3
The J-3 is the Directorate for Operations. The responsibilities of the J-3
are to assist in the direction and control of operations and plan, coordinate and integrate
operations. The mission of the J-3 is to assist the Chairman in carrying out his
responsibilities as the principal advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA) by
developing and providing guidance to the combatant commands and by relaying
communications between the authority and unified commanders regarding current
operations and plans. The J-3 is the directorate that moves military forces, conducts
detailed operational briefings to the national leadership and serves as the operational link
between the warfighting Commanders in Chief and the NCA. The J-3 is responsible for
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synchronizing and monitoring worldwide military operations and activities in support of a
national military strategy emphasizing flexible and selective engagement.33
The J-3 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 242
officers, 86 enlisted personnel and 22 civilians. Currently there are three National Guard
personnel assigned to the J-3, an ANG Operations Officer in the Readiness Division (an
ANG 06), an Operations Officer whose position is to be deleted (an ANG 04), and a
Reserve Forces Advisor (an ARNG 05). The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-
3 are the Readiness Division, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) branch, the Deputy
Director for Information Operations, the Defense and Space Operations Division, and the
Special Operations Division.
(1) Readiness Division. The Readiness Division was formed in
response to a tasking by the CJCS to define, measure and fix joint readiness. The
division redefined readiness to include a view of readiness from the tactical, operational
and strategic levels of war and is the single point of contact for all current readiness
issues. In order to collect, analyze, measure and begin fixing joint readiness, the division
implemented the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) which is briefed monthly to
the VCJCS.34
In addition to the JMRR, the division chairs one of the Joint
Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) teams on joint readiness. The team
influences the planning, programming, and budgeting process by providing inputs to the
Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Chairman's Program Recommendation
(CPR). Additionally, the Readiness Division has responsibility for the Status of
Resources and Training System, DOD's central automated registry, which keeps track of
33
"Directorate for Operations (J-3)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<www. dtic .mil/ i cs/j 3 .html>. [24 January 2000].
34
"Directorate for Operations (J-3)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<www.dtic.mil/jcs/j3.html>. [24 January 2000].
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all operational U.S. Military units and indicates the level of resources and training status
required to undertake missions for which the units were organized. 35
Readiness Division Recommendation. The National Guard is
authorized and has assigned an ANG 0-6 to the Readiness Division. The position's
responsibilities include advising the J-3 Director on RC readiness, developing readiness
briefings used by the CJCS and the SecDef to update the President and Congress, writing
the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress, and providing readiness input to the DPG
and CJCS Program Recommendations and Program Assessment. Recommend continued
assignment of an 0-6 (ARNG or ANG) to this authorized position.
(2) JFCOM Branch. JFCOM is the lead organization in domestic
operations such as Homeland Defense, Consequence Management, and National Disaster
Response. JFCOM is also responsible for Military Support to Civilian Authority
(MSCA), Weapons of Mass Destruction/Consequence management (WMD/CM),
NORAD support, and Counter Drug missions. The National Guard has traditionally been
a critical element in these domestic response missions.
When interviewed, a current J-3 JFCOM member said a National
Guard representative would greatly enhance its ability to accomplish its missions by
providing National Guard planning expertise.36 The Deputy Directorate for Combating
Terrorism echoed the same comments saying they would utilize a National Guard
representative for coordinating and planning the use of Guard assets in their planning
processes.37
The JFCOM Branch also reviews unified command operational
plans, contingency plans and proposed rules of engagement for specific operations to
3
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"Directorate for Operations (J-3)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:
<www.dtic .mi L j cs/j 3 .html> . [24 January 2000].
36 Interview with LTC Hans Meinhardt, USA, JFCOM branch, WESTHEM division, J-3, 10 April 2000.
->
' Interview with LTC Williams, USA, Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism, Plans and Policy
Division, J-3, 11 April 00.
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ensure consistency with national standing rules and other applicable guidance. JFCOM
also serves as the J-3 point of contact for operational military matters concerning federal
military support of civil defense, civil disturbances and civil emergencies. Finally, the
division prepares special studies and analysis related to operational matters and provides
recommended courses of action.
JFCOM Branch Recommendation. Recommend creating a new
position for the National Guard in the J-3 JFCOM Branch and assigning an 0-5 (ARNG)
to integrate the Guard into JFCOM planning, to include the future Homeland Defense
roles and missions identified in RCE 2005.
(3) Information Operations, Operations Division (IO/DO). Within
the Information Operations Directorate is the Capabilities Division. The Capabilities
Division provides Information Operations (10) and Special Technical Operations (STO)
staff support to the JCS, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Combatant
Commanders. This Division is important to the Guard because it provides the Guard with
an active liaison on the development of joint policy, strategy and doctrine concerning
Information Operations/Information Warfare (IO/IW).
IO/DO Recommendations. The National Guard is authorized this
position but it is currently vacant. The position's responsibilities include providing 10
and STO staff support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the SecDef, and Combatant
Commanders; providing a focal point in the directorate for computer network attack and
computer network defense; developing joint policy, strategy, and doctrine concerning
IO/IW policy operations, and programs with the joint staff, OSD, the services,
intelligence community, defense agencies and the Unified Commands; and support the
National Command Authorities, the CJCS, and the Unified Commanders in the
command, control, and conduct of IO/IW. Recommend assigning an 0-4 (ARNG or
ANG) to this authorized position.
(4) Defense and Space Operations Division. The Defense Space
Operations Division is organized into two functional branches, the Joint Missile and Air
Defense Branch and the Space Operations Branch. The Joint Missile and Air Defense
32
Branch is the J-3 focal point for air and missile defense issues. The Space Branch is the
joint sponsor for the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program, which
provides the warfighting Commanders in Chief with the means to leverage our space
forces. The Director of the Defense and Space Operations Division stated that if the
Guard were tasked with the NMD mission, it would be very important for the Guard to
have representation in the Defense and Space Operations Division. A National Guard
representative in this capacity would be a reference for the Defense and Space Operations
Division on the NMD as well as other National Guard assets in support of space, missile
and air defense branches.
Defense and Space Operations Division Recommendation.
Recommend creating a National Guard position in the Defense and Space Operations
Division and assigning an 0-5 (ARNG or ANG) to represent and integrate the Guard into
joint space operations.
(5) Special Operations Division. The Special Operations Division
is responsible for Joint Staff matters relating to operational aspects of employing special
operations forces, including special, psychological operations and civil affairs forces.
Special operations involve unconventional warfare, weapons counterproliferation,
counterterrorism, direct action, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, special
reconnaissance and civil affairs. The division consists of five functional branches:
Special Operations Forces, Support Activities, Operational Support, Psychological
Operations and Civil Affairs, and Counterproliferation.
Each branch ensures policy, strategy, doctrine and resource
guidance are integrated into the National Military Strategy, joint doctrine and other joint
initiatives. The division coordinates with unified commands for special operations forces
execution of operational plans and contingency plans, deployment of required special
operations forces and coordination with other government agencies. In addition to ANG
support to the Special Operations, the ARNG has two Special Forces Groups. A National
Guard Special Operations Force (SOF) integrator would provide the Special Operations
Division with Guard expertise in planning for their use.
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Special Operations Division Recommendation. The National
Guard is authorized this position but it is currently vacant. The responsibilities of this
position are to act as an advisor to the Chief, Special Operations Division on all aspects
of RC Special Operations Forces (SOF); responsibility for all actions relating to
readiness, training, exercises, mobilization and validation; coordinate with the CNGB,
Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) and Army Reserve Personnel Center to expedite
operational planning and execution; and serve as a member of the CJCS crisis action
team in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) during crisis and contingency
operations. Recommend assigning an 0-5 (ARNG) to insure National Guard Special
Forces are represented and integrated into joint operations.
d. J-4
The J-4 is the Logistics Directorate. The responsibilities of the Logistics
Directorate are to formulate logistic plans; coordinate and supervise supply, maintenance,
repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics matters; and ensure
effective logistics support for all forces in the command.
The J-4 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 63
officers, 8 enlisted personnel and 12 civilians. Currently the National Guard has one
person assigned to the J-4, an ANG Advisor (an ANG 06). The issue areas for the
National Guard in the J-4 are the Deployment Division, the International Logistics and
Exercises Division, and the Logistics Readiness Center.
(1) Deployment Division. The Deployment Division was created
from a special action group formed to study lessons learned from the Joint Endeavor
deployment to Bosnia. The Deployment Division is designed as a think tank to improve
the deployment processes and deployment systems. The Deployment Division is
important to the Guard because it would give the Guard representation in improving the
joint deployment process for National Guard units by addressing Guard specific issues.
Deployment Division Recommendation. Recommend assigning
the current authorized but vacant J-4 ARNG 0-6 advisor position to the Deployment
Division.
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(2) International Logistics and Exercises (ELE) Division. The ILE
Division supports the CJCS with up to date information on international logistics and
engineering issues involving CINCs, Services, DOD Agencies, and others as required.
International Logistics issues include bilateral and multinational contingency support,
multinational logistics doctrine, interagency policy participation, and United Nations and
NATO logistics liaison. Engineering issues include engineer support to current
operations, doctrine development, exercise-related operationally-focused construction,
environmental concerns and others. ILE also serves as the multinational logistics and
civil engineering support concept developer and enabler for Focused Logistics.
ILE Division Recommendation. The National Guard is
authorized and has assigned an ANG 0-6 to the ILE Division. The position's
responsibilities include supervising the development and use of global logistic resources
to enhance readiness; developing national policy and operational planning for
mobilization, medical, industrial base, sustainability, programming/budgeting,
transportation and international logistics; and overseeing logistics doctrine and Joint
Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA). Recommend continued assignment of an O-
6 (ANG) to this authorized position.
(3) Logistics Readiness Center. The LRC manages current
logistical operations and responds to crisis actions from the National Military Command
Center. The LRC is organized to manage daily logistics actions, as well as actions
required during periods of national emergency, heightened international tensions,
exercises, and extraordinary situations that require intensive management. These actions
include response to disasters and humanitarian relief requests. The LRC provides the
nucleus staff and facilities necessary to meet the logistics taskings of the Chairman and
higher authorities during crisis.38
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Logistics Readiness Center Recommendation. Recommend
creating a new National Guard position and assigning an 0-5 (ARNG or ANG) in the J-4
Logistics Readiness Center to integrate the Guard into all LRC operations.
e. J-5
The J-5 is the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. The J-5 is the focal
point for assisting the CJCS in current and future military strategy, planning guidance and
policy, politico-military advice and policies, military positions on projected and ongoing
international negotiations, and interagency coordination within these areas. The J-5 is
responsible for assisting commanders with long-range or future planning, preparing
campaign and operation plans, and preparing estimates of the situation.39
The J-5 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 152
officers, 23 enlisted personnel and 21 civilians. Currently the National Guard is
authorized one position in the J-5 which is vacant. The issue areas for the National Guard
in the J-5 are the Strategic Plans Branch and the Interagency Policy Section.
(1) Strategic Plans Branch. The Strategic Plans Branch is a sub-
element of the Deputy Directorate for Strategy and Policy (DDS&P). The DDS&P is the
focal point for the strategic planning required to prepare our Armed Forces for the 21st
century. In part, the directorate satisfies this responsibility through the development of
the NMS. In concert with this strategy, the directorate develops advice for planning and
programming guidance and recommends inputs to the Secretary of Defense in preparation
of his contingency planning guidance. A landmark example of the directorate's work in
this regard is the development of Theater Engagement Planning, a new strategic planning
system that parallels the existing deliberate planning process for contingencies.40
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The directorate is also responsible for reviewing the strategic
environment for trends and issues that affect national security planning. The mechanism
for this analysis is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) that recommends, as necessary,
enhancements and incremental changes to the current NMS and identifies alternative
strategies for the future. The directorate also develops the Chairman's strategic long-
range vision for the future. The current document, Joint Vision 2010, is the conceptual
blueprint for how the Armed Forces will leverage technological advances, integrate new
operational concepts, and channel the vitality and innovation of our services to achieve
more seamless and coherent joint operations in the future. Additionally, the directorate is
responsible for developing the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that apportions
forces to the Warfighting Commanders in Chief.41
Within the area of policy development, DDS&P is responsible for
leading the Chairman's biennial review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and
developing Joint Staff positions on such key issues as the organization, roles and
missions, and functions of the Armed Forces and the combatant commands. The
directorate also plays an important role in advising the JROC. DDS&P is also
responsible for coordinating the activities of two Joint Warfighting Capabilities
Assessment (JWCA) teams dealing with the issues of Deterrence/Counterproliferation
and Regional Engagement/Overseas Presence. 42
Strategic Plans Branch Recommendation. Recommend creating
a new position in the J-5 Strategic Plans Branch and assigning an 0-5 (ARNG or ANG)
to represent the National Guard in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National
Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Theater
Engagement Plans (TEPs).
41
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(2) Interagency Policy Section. The Interagency Policy Section
coordinates with government and non government agencies and is responsible to provide
military advice to the National Command Authority (NCA), be a spokesman for the
Unified Combatant Commanders, develop and oversee joint policy, and insure
compliance with established DOD policy. Additionally, the Interagency Policy Section is
responsible for new presidential administration transitions, CINC conferences, Joint Staff
off-sites, and interaction with the State Department.43
Interagency Policy Section Recommendation. The National
Guard is authorized this position but it is currently vacant. The position's responsibilities
include participating in the biennial review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and
triennial reviews of roles, missions, and functions of the Armed Forces; act as the J-5
interface with the J-8 on Reserve fiscal policy issues and coordinate with the J-3 on
Reserve force capabilities for operations other than war, total force policy, counterdrug,
counterterrorism, and counterproliferation policy issues. Additionally, provide a Reserve
perspective for CJCS sponsored exercises; joint doctrine, tactics, and techniques
development; and issues related to the development and coordination of space-related
policy and mission areas including theater missile defense. Recommend assigning an 0-5
(ARNG) to the currently vacant position.
/ J-6
The J-6 is the Directorate for Command, Control, Communications and
Computer Systems (C4). The mission of the J-6 is to provide the CJCS advice and
recommendations on C4 matters, support warfighters from the CINC to the shooter, lead
the C4 community, oversee support for the National Military Command System, and lead
[Online]: <www.dtic.mil/ics/J5.htrnl>. [9 May 2000].
43 Interview with CDR Joyce, J-5 Interagency Policy Section, 1 1 April 2000.
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in identifying and resolving military aspects of information-based issues of national
importance.44
The J-6 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 90
officers, 13 enlisted personnel and 21 civilians. Currently there are two National Guard
personnel assigned to the J-6, a Reserve Component Advisor (an ANG 06), and a RC
Global Positioning System Officer (an ANG 05). The issue areas for the National Guard
in the J-6 are the Directorate RC Advisor, Technology and Architecture Division, and the
RC C4 Assessment Division.
(1) Directorate RC Advisor. The J6 RC advisor provides
recommendations and guidance on C4 issues affecting the Total Force and specifically
the RC, which account for approximately 50 percent of the tactical C4 capabilities.
Additionally, the RC advisor is responsible to review and comment on Planning,
Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
for RC C4 inputs; monitors RC force structure and equipment issues to ensure CINC
support is not degraded or inconsistent with stated CINC requirements; coordinates with
counternarcotics C4I network planning, development, implementation and execution;
supports the J-3 Counternarcotics Operations Division by coordinating C4 system support
to operational tasking; serves as the RC representative on working groups for C4I issues
where RC issues are addressed and are integral to the Total Force policy; maintain liaison
with DOD, RC headquarters and gaining active duty major commands to ensure
continuity and currency of service related activities; and advises and represents the J-6 at
Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) reviews at the DOD level.45
Directorate RC Advisor Recommendation. Recommend
continuing to fill this position with an 0-6 (ARNG or ANG).
44
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(2) Technology and Architecture Division. The Air National
Guard Liaison Officer to the J-6 Technology and Architecture Division is responsible for
providing analysis, assessment and recommendations to the J-6, CJCS, OSD and
Congress on Joint Warfighter requirements, capabilities and shortfalls. Additional
responsibilities include development, coordination, and staffing of requirements and
policies that insure all U.S. and allied forces are provided reliable positioning, navigation
and timing information; ensure RC future capability to be interoperable with the active
services through the CJCS's Global Position System (GPS) security mandate; interface
with the JWCA process to preserve warfighter capabilities on GPS; co-chair the Joint
SATCOM (Satellite Communications) Panel that reviews and validates all DOD
SATCOM requirements; prepare and staff the CJCS's Master Positioning, Navigation
and Timing Plan which implements the DOD's Positioning and Navigation (Pos/Nav)
policy, validate Pos/Nav requirements, compare requirements to existing technology,
identify performance shortfalls, highlight needed research and development, and provide
long-term projections of anticipated capabilities.46
Technology and Architecture Division Recommendation.
Recommend continuing to fill the current position in the J-6 with an 0-5 (ANG).
(3) RC C4 Assessment Division. The RC C4 Assessment officer
is responsible for providing a Total Force perspective in developing C4 assessment
methodology and preparing C4 assessments for the CJCS and SecDef. Additional
responsibilities include evaluating CENC C4 requirements and mission needs; identifying
C4 issues and formulating Joint Staff recommendations on courses of action; developing
joint C4 program priorities in support of the NMS and its objectives; prepare and present
recommendations to the VCJCS and JROC on C4 JWCA; collaborate on warfighting
70A, 10 Jan 97
46 "Duty Description." Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, RC C4 Assessment Officer, JS
Form 70A, 1 1 May 00
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assessments and reports to Congress, such as the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA);
collaborate on JSPS, PPBS and DPG; Coordinate with OSD, the Joint Staff; Agencies
and RC headquarters to insure currency ofjoint activities.47
RC C4 Assessment Division Recommendation. Recommend
continuing to fill the current position with an 0-5 (ARNG or ANG).
g. J-7
The J-7 is the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate. Key
products the J-7 is responsible for are the Joint Training Policy (provides CJCS policy for
joint training and addresses the importance of preparing U.S. Forces for multinational and
interagency operations), Joint Training Master Plan 2000 (provides guidance from the
CJCS to the combatant commands and services for planning and conducting joint training
and exercises), Joint Training Manual (provides guidance for implementing CJCS's
policy for planning and conducting joint training within the Joint Training System), and
the Universal Joint Task List (provides a standardized tool for describing requirements in
48
the planning, conducting, assessing, and evaluating joint and multinational training).
Each J-7 division serves a key role in the overall interoperability process.
Conventional War Plans provide U.S. armed forces the "what" to train for and be ready to
do. Doctrine tells joint forces "how" to train and operate. Exercises and Training
provides the "how" to practice for deployable joint forces. The Joint Warfighting Center
provides the "how" to train joint commanders and staffs. Education is the "how" to
develop creative and critical analysis capability in joint warfighters and strategists.
Evaluation and Analysis is the "how" to make sure we have it right and are truly
interoperable. Just as interoperability institutionalizes teamwork, the focused process
47
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within J-7 generates synergy — the resulting interoperable team is more powerful than its
individual parts.49
The J-7 is lead by a two star general or flag officer and is authorized 54
officers, 10 enlisted personnel and 10 civilians. Currently, there are three National Guard
officers assigned to the J-7, a RC advisor (an ARNG 06), and two RC Conventional War
Planners (both ARNG 04's). The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-7 are the
Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division, the Conventional War Plans Division,
the Joint Assessment and Analysis Division, and the Joint Vision and Doctrine Division.
(1) Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division. The Joint
Doctrine, Education and Training Division develops joint training and exercise policies
and procedures to ensure our forces are prepared to fight as a team. The division is
organized into three branches to perform these functions, the Joint Training Branch, the
CINC Exercise branch, and the Joint Exercise Branch.
The Joint Training Branch develops and implements joint training
policy and guidance for the Chairman by publishing "CJCS Joint Training Policy for the
U.S. Armed Forces." The branch is the architect and advocate of the Chairman's Joint
Training System, the process joint commanders use to identify training requirements,
develop effective training plans, conduct joint training and assess its effectiveness. The
branch also coordinates modeling and simulation policy for joint training and exercises. 50
The CINC Exercise Branch plays a key role in the Chairman's joint
training program through management and oversight of major issues for unified
command joint and multinational exercises. The Chairman's exercise funds are used to
pay for strategic transportation ~ to include airlift, sealift, port handling and inland
transportation ~ for exercises in the schedule. The CINC Exercise Branch also manages
49
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the Commanders in Chief Initiatives Fund. This fund supports low-cost, high-benefit
initiatives that enhance warfighting capabilities, readiness and sustainability of forces
assigned to the unified commands. 51
The Chairman's Sponsored Joint Exercise Training Branch
manages five national-level exercise programs. These exercises focus on plans, policies,
procedures and training required to ensure our senior leaders can effectively direct and
integrate U.S. and coalition military forces during war. These large command post
exercises are usually conducted annually to examine crisis management procedures for
mobilization, deployment, employment and sustainment of forces worldwide.52
The Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division continues to
advance the effectiveness of joint training through the Better Exercises and Training
Campaign. Their exercise program review ensures unified command exercises support
national strategy while using the most effective training mediums for the intended
training audience. The division continues to develop the Joint Training System. This
system is the Chairman's principal tool to implement joint force training policy. The
system defines a multistep approach to identify requirements and plan, program, conduct
and assess joint training events. Early system development concentrated on the orderly
and detailed identification of training requirements.
Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division
Recommendation. The National Guard is authorized and has assigned an ARNG 0-6 to
the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division. Recommend continued assignment
of an 0-6 (ARNG) to this authorized position.
Available [Online]: <\\^av.dtic.mil/'ics/core/ietd.html>. [24 January 2000].
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(2) Conventional War Plans Division. The Conventional War
Plans Division is responsible for the deliberate planning process and for implementing the
Chairman's vision of creating the best possible plans. Military planners conduct
deliberate planning when they have the luxury of time. The deliberate planning process
clearly establishes force capabilities and provides the opportunity to evaluate a broad
range of available options. By using the same campaign planning principles used in crisis
action plans, deliberate planning's greatest benefit is easing the transition from peace to
war in the event of a crisis.
Conventional War Plans Division Recommendation. The
National Guard is authorized and has assigned two ARNG 0-4' s to the Conventional
Warplans Division. Recommend continued assignment of two 0-4/0-5 's (ARNG or
ANG) to the two authorized positions. One position is responsible for TEPs and MTW
planning, and the other is responsible for Annexes A and T of the Joint Operational
Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
(3) Joint Assessment and Analysis Division (JAAD). The JAAD
provides the CJCS an independent assessment of CINC warfighting readiness through the
Remedial Action Plan (RAP), the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP), and the JWCA
Program. The Division functionally links assessments, lessons learned, and corrective
actions to improve joint warfighting effectiveness.
Joint Assessment and Analysis Division Recommendation.
Recommend creating a position in the Joint Assessment and Analysis Division and
assigning an 0-5 (ARNG) to the position to represent the Guard in the RAP, JLLP, and
JWCA programs.
(4) Joint Vision and Doctrine Division. Joint doctrine is a key
element in the interoperability process. Joint Doctrine is the "how" of joint
interoperability; it is the playbook by which our team develops the game plan for practice
and execution. Joint doctrine fundamentally shapes the way we think about and prepare
for warfighting and operations other than war. It offers a common perspective from
which to plan and operate. Although it is not policy and does not replace a commander's
44
good judgement, joint doctrine represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment
of the U.S. armed forces.53
Joint Vision and Doctrine Division Recommendation.
Recommend creating a position in the J-7 Joint Vision and Doctrine Division and
assigning an 0-5 (ARNG) to the position.
h. J-8
The J-8 is the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate.
The J-8 was established in response to the increased responsibilities and authority placed
on the Chairman by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The J-8
provides resource and force structure analysis and advice to the Chairman and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. A focal point of the J-8 is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) where the J-8 provides much of the assessment of the council's review of defense
resource policy on a myriad of items. 54
The J-8 also assesses and recommends near-, mid-, and long-term force
structure to support national security objectives, policy and strategy. The Division is also
responsible for the "Forces for the Unified Commands," the force tables for the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Strategic Forces Mix DataBase Handbook.
Additionally, it is the joint staff lead in major studies such as the Congressionally
mandated Roles and Missions Commission and Reserve Component Integration
Studies.
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The J-8 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 1 1
1
officers, 12 enlisted personnel and 22 civilians. Currently, there is one National Guard
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officer (an ARNG 05) assigned to the J-8 Joint Requirements Division as a Reserve
Forces Analyst. The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-8 are the Joint
Requirements Division and the Joint Warfighting Analysis Division.
( 1
)
Joint Requirements Division. The Requirements, Assessments
and Integration Division is the J-8 executive agent for the responsibilities of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) secretary. The Division is also the proponent
for planning, coordinating and integrating the activities of the entire Joint Warfighting
Capability Assessment (JWCA) process. This responsibility includes focusing the
assessment efforts of the joint assessment teams, executing the JROC visits with the
unified commands and supporting the development of critical policy documents such as
the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), Chairman's Program Assessment
(CPA) and Joint Military Net Assessment. Finally, the Division employs a joint
warfighting perspective to analyze operational requirements from development of
Mission-Needs Statements (MNSs) through acquisition Milestone Zero.
Joint Requirements Division Recommendation. Recommend
continuing to fill the current position in the J-8 Joint Requirements Division, however,
the role, responsibilities and access to the J-8 leadership need to be expanded.
(2) Warfighting Analysis Division. The Warfighting Analysis
Division conducts studies and analyses of conventional forces and, to a limited degree,
strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. The Division uses a broad range of operations
research methods to analyze the plans, programs, strategies and policies that define
military sufficiency and force capabilities.
Warfighting Analysis Division Recommendations. Recommend
creating a new 0-5 position (ARNG) in the Joint Warfighting Analysis Division to
represent the National Guard.
/. DOM
The Directorate of Management (DOM) is organized into five offices and
is one of the largest directorates. The DOM provides assistance to the CJCS and the Joint
Staff through management, planning and direction of support activities including
46
correspondence administration, budget and finance, action management and archiving,
information technology, services, resources and all aspects of staff and information
security.
56
The DOM is lead by a Colonel or Navy Captain and is authorized 26
officers, 83 enlisted personnel and 55 civilians. Currently, there is one National Guard
officer (an ARNG 04) assigned to the DOM as the Joint Staff RC Advisor for Site R.
The issue area for the National Guard in the DOM is the Joint Staff RC Advisor for Site
R.
(1) Joint Staff RC Advisor, Site R. Site R is a relocation facility
and National Military Command System node for use in the event of evacuation of the
Pentagon. This position provides for Guard/Reserve presence at the site. The RC advisor
also coordinates Guard/Reserve actions for the JCS Crisis Action Team support for
exercises and for the Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) concerning relocation team
support activities. Additionally, the RC advisor assists DOM with oversight
responsibility of the Site R Joint Staff Information Resource Management Office network
systems and coordinates RC requirements in the planning actions.57
Joint Staff RC Advisor, Site R Recommendation. Recommend
continuing to fill this position. In the event Site R is used, for a real mission or for
training, this position will be critically important.
j. Existing Positions Not Already Addressed
The National Guard has four positions on the Joint Staff that have not
specifically been addressed thus far. The four positions are in the ACJCS/NG Office and
the Joint History Office. The positions are certainly important as evidenced in the duty
descriptions of each position, however, many of their duties replicate duties already being
56
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performed within the Joint Directorates. The concern with replication of effort is it adds
another step in the process and the Guard does not have enough resources to duplicate
efforts. The following is a review of each position and a recommendation on where the
position might be more advantageous for the National Guard.
(1) ACJCS/NG Strategic Planner. The duty description for this
position includes representing the ACJCS/NG in the strategic planning process to identify
RC inequities and facilitate RC representation in the documentation preparation process,
coordinate with the J-7 Conventional Warplans Division to insure appropriate RC
inclusion in the CINC OPLANS/CONPLANS/TEPs, and maintaining access and working
capability on the GCCS/JOPES applications and computer systems vital to ongoing
analysis and review ofRC equity. 58
The J-5 is the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate in the Joint
Staff and one that could greatly influence joint integration of the Guard in the areas
described in this position's duties. Recommend this position be re-assigned to the
recommended new J-5 Strategy Division position responsible to work with the NSS,
NMS, JSCP, JDP and TEP's.
(2) ACJCS/NG Force Advisor. The duty description for this
position includes conducting analysis of DOD plans, programs, policies, initiatives and
concepts to determine implications for the use of the RC in carrying out the NMS;
develop recommendations to enhance RC integration; represent the ACJCS/NG in the
RCE 2005 Study, Mobility Requirements Study - 05 (MRS-05), and the DPG; team chief
for the Studies, Strategy, and Plans areas of operation; insures RC is represented in Joint
Form 70A, December 1992.
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Staff forums and RC Subject Matter Experts (SME's) are included in Joint Staff studies
and committees; participate as the senior non-flag RC representative on all Joint Staff
studies; act as the RC representative on the MRS-05 Battle Staff; attend the Joint Review
Panel; serve on the JSR steering group and the Army Strategic Mobility Panel; and
develop, coordinate and assign plans and JWCA officers to their Joint Staff activities. 59
Recommend the senior Guard member (an 0-6) assume this role
on the Joint Staff. The duties described in this position could be tasked out by the senior
member to the SME's in each directorate and consolidated as required.
(3) ACJCS/NG JRB/JWCA Action Officer. The duty description
for this position includes coordinating RC representation within the twelve JWCA panels,
attend pre-JROC meetings to identify issues of interest in the RC community and prepare
the ACJCS/NG to attend the JROC Review Boards (JRB) and/or the JROC, and provide
an RC perspective on key issues affecting the Total Force.60 Recommend the senior
Guard member on the Joint Staff who has JWCA panel responsibilities assume the
responsibilities of this position.
(4) Joint History Office, RC Advisor. The duty description for
this position includes advising the Director for Joint History on the RC role in carrying
out the Joint History program; representing the Director in discussion with service
historians, joint command history offices, and RC representatives on policy issues
5"
"Duty Description." Joint Staff Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, Force Advisor. JS Form
70A, December 1992.
60
"Duty Description." Joint Staff Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, JRB/JWCA Action
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relating to the utilization of RC historians; advise the Director on policy, program and
procedures for joint training, on responding to requests from combatant commands for
individual RC historians or teams to perform joint missions, on tables of organization and
equipment for joint history organizations, and on operating procedures; maintain an up-
to-date knowledge of availability, readiness, training and deployability of RC historians
as teams and individuals; update training plans, track availability of equipment
compatible with that used by deploying joint commands, continuously reassess table of
equipment and operating procedures; monitor work of military personnel assigned to the
Joint Staff History Office; and assist the Director and the Chiefs of the Joint Operational
and Joint Staff History Branches to evaluate and prepare manuscripts for publication and
distribution to military schools, subordinate commands, and military journals. 61
Recommend re-assigning this position to the J-3 Directorate to the
proposed JFCOM Branch position. This position is certainly one of significance and is
beneficial; however, due to limited Guard resources it is a nicety, not a necessity.
B. SUMMARY
The National Guard's role on the Joint Chiefs of Staff needs to be increased in the
key areas that directly influence joint integration of the National Guard. The positions
recommended in this chapter are areas that have the greatest impact on joint integration of
the Guard. The goal is not to increase the numerical representation, but rather the
influential representation of the Guard on the JCS. In a further step, the recommended
positions in this chapter are placed in priority order in Chapter V (Figure 5-1).
Officer. JS Form 70A, December 1992.
6*
"Duty Description." Joint Staff Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, RC Advisor, Joint
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In many cases, the positions recommended already exist, but not all-existing
positions were recommended. The positions in section I, d., "Existing positions not
already addressed," of this chapter already exist, but are lower in priority than the other
positions recommended within the Joint Staff. The implication of the recommendations
is some existing positions should be given up in favor of recommended positions of
higher priority to best support joint integration of the National Guard.
History Office. JS Form 70A, December 1992.
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V. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE NEED FOR A LARGER ROLE ON THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The recommendation to increase the number of full-time National Guard general
officers, officers and senior non-commissioned officers in the Joint Staff and other joint
organizations is consistent with the recommendations of RCE 2005 and is supported by
the Reserve Forces Policy Board. 6 Creating more staff positions in such organizations,
however, will be a resource challenge for the National Guard. The Guard already faces
this challenge throughout its full-time force and has identified full-time support as its
number one unfunded requirement to Congress. If increasing the National Guard role
numerically on the JCS is not possible; it is imperative the Guard representatives already
there are in the positions that most benefit joint integration of the Guard. The National
Guard may decide to maintain its current strength on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or increase
it gradually as resources become available; the recommendations in figure 5-1 support
either case.
In order to account for the resourcing issues the National Guard faces; the
recommendations for increasing the role of the National Guard are presented in the form
of a "1-N list." The 1-N list (figure 5-1) is a prioritized listing of the current and
recommended positions for the Guard on the JCS. The goal of the 1-N list is to prioritize
the positions in the order in which they will impact the joint integration of the Guard. If
the Guard decides to maintain its current strength, but maximize its effectiveness, the
current personnel should be re-assigned within the JCS to fill the highest priority
positions. If the National Guard decides to gradually increase its representation, as
62 Booz, Allen and Hamilton. The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (2 August 1999):
Available [Online]: <\\^v.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005 072299.html>. [28 January 2000].
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resources become available, the positions should be filled in the priority order
recommended on the 1 -N list.
B. THE RECOMMENDATIONS
The following (Figure 5-1) lists recommended positions, in priority order, by
directorate, within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
PRIORITY DIRECTORATE/POSITION RESPONSIBILITIES RANK ANG/ARNG NEW POS'N
1 ACJCS/NG Primary NG assistant to CJCS 0-8 No(ARNG)
2 ACJCS/NG / XO Primary assistant to ACJCS/NG 0-5 ANG No (ANG)
3 J-7 / Joint Doctrine. Ed and Training Div RC integration into J-7 0-6 ARNG No (ARNG)
4 J-3/ JFCOM Branch Integrate NG into JFCOM CM msn 0-5 ARNG Yes
5 J-7 / Conventional War Plans TEP/2nd MTW 0-5 ARNG No (ARNG)
6 J-7 / Conventional War Plans Annex A & T/JOPES 0-5 ARNG No (ARNG)
7 J-7 / Joint Vision and Doctrine Division DOCNET, JDOL, ADL 0-5 Yes
8 J-8 / Joint Requirements Division RC Integration 0-5 ARNG No (ARNG)
9 J-3 / Information Operations Division Liaison and coordination for IO/IW 0-4 ANG No (vacant)
10 J-5 / Strategy Division NSS, NMS, JSCP, JDP, TEPs 0-5 Yes
11 J-5 / Interagency Policy Section RC advisor for UCP, roles/missions 0-5 ARNG No (vacant)
12 J-6 / Directorate RC Advisor RC advisor for J-6 0-6 ANG No (ANG)
13 J-3 / Readiness Division Advises J-3 on RC readiness 0-6 ANG No (ANG)
14 J-7 / Joint Assessment and Analysis Div RC mobilization, JAARS and RAP 0-5 Yes
15 J-6 / Technology and Architecture Div Advise J-6 on space related issues 0-5 ANG No (ANG)
16 J-8 / Joint Warfighting Analysis Div RC integration into MTW, SSCs 0-5 ARNG Yes
17 J-6 / RC C4 Assessment Division JWCA assessment officer W-5 ARNG No (ARNG)
18 J-3 / Special Operations Division Advises J-3 on RC SOF 0-5 ARNG No (vacant)
19 J-3 / Defense and Space Opns Division National Missile Defense 0-4 Yes
20 J-4 / Deployment Div/ARNG Advisor ARNG advisor/deployments 0-6 ARNG No (vacant)
21 J-4 / Int'l log & Exercises/ANG Advisor Develop global logistics resources 0-5 ANG No (ANG)
22 J-2 / J2R Integrate NG into J-2 operations E-8 Yes
23 OCJCS / Legislative Assistant Office Represent NG JCS issues 0-5 Yes
24 OCJCS / Public Affairs Office NG Public Affairs for Joint Opns E-8 Yes
25 J-4 / Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) RC Advisor for LRC 0-5 Yes
26 DOM / Chief Operations RC Joint Staff RC advisor, Site R 0-4 ARNG No (ARNG)
27 ACJCS/NG / Strategic Planner Rep ACJCS in strat planning docs 0-5 ARNG No (ARNG)
28 ACJCS/NG / Force Advisor Implications of RC use in NMS 0-6 ARNG No (ARNG)
29 ACJCS/NG / JRB.JWCA Action Officer RC rep on JWCA, JRB/JROC 0-5 ARNG No (ARNG)
30 Joint History Office / RC Advisor Advise RC role in Joint History Pgm 0-6 ANG No (ANG)
Figure 5-1 . Recommended Positions in Priority Order.
C. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS
The success of implementing the solutions I propose can only be realized




Joint Chiefs of Staff. First, the National Guard must develop a plan for educating its
officers in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and then must track it. Second,
the Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, must control the selection process and
assignment of all officers on the Joint Staff. The National Guard should send officers
who can represent both Army and Air Guard perspectives. Third, the selection process
must identify the best officers the National Guard has. The active component sends their
future leaders to the Joint Staff, and so must the National Guard.
The active component requires (by direction from Goldwater-Nichols) the officers
assigned to the JCS to be highly competitive for promotion. The active component also
requires that its General Officers have Joint experience. The Guard must, whenever
possible, pursue these same standards to gain the same legitimacy as its active
counterparts.
The National Guard members of the Joint Staff must also work together to ensure
a unified effort in the joint environment. The current Guard role on the joint staff could
benefit from regularly scheduled meetings. If Guard members of the joint staff could
meet on a regular basis, Guard specific issues could be discussed to allow a coordinated
effort throughout the joint environment. Coordinated efforts enhance the effectiveness of
the Guard and create a forum for important issues to be presented to the National Guard
leadership.
D. SUMMARY
An increased role on the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not only an important step to
integrating the National Guard into joint operations; it is a golden opportunity. The
National Guard is becoming a larger part of the Total Force and its roles and missions
identified in RCE 2005 will likely increase in the future. The National Guard must be
prepared to perform these new roles and missions seamlessly as part of the Total Force.
The Nation's reliance on the citizen soldier came into question with the Cold War,
but it is now returning to its pre-Cold War status as an integral part of the U.S. Military.
The post-Cold War world has become smaller due to technology, which has resulted in a
greater reliance on joint operations. The Guard must be an effective member of the Full
55
Spectrum Force described in Joint Vision 2010 and must be interoperable in the joint
environment. The National Guard and Active Component leadership owes it to its
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